गोलन हाइट्स

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गोलन उचाई
هضبة الجولان
רמת הגולן
Brechat ram mt hermon.JPGLake Ram near माउन्ट हर्मन (पृष्ठभूमि), उत्तरपुर्व गोलन हाइट
गोलन उचाईको स्थिति
Status अन्तरास्ट्रिय मान्यता : सिरियाली भूभाग , इजरायलद्वारा सैन्य कब्जा
 - जम्मा १,८०० किमी (६९५ वर्ग मी)
 - इजरायलद्वारा कब्जा १,२०० किमी (४६३.३ वर्ग मी)
 - सिरियाली अरब गणतन्त्र , सिरियाली बिपक्षी , तहरीर अल -शाम र खालिद इब अल वालिद आर्मी द्वारा मिश्रित नियन्त्रित ६०० किमी (२३१.७ वर्ग मी)
अधिकतम उचाईं २,८१४ मि (९,२३२ फिट)
न्युनतम उचाईं -२१२ मि (-६९६ फिट)

The गोलन हाइट्स  (उचाई ) Golan Heights (अरबी: هضبة الجولان Haḍbatu 'l-Jawlān or مرتفعات الجولانمرتفعات الجولان Murtafaʻātu l-Jawlān, HebrewHebrew: רמת הגולן‎‎רמת הגולןHebrew: רמת הגולן‎‎, Ramat HaGolan About this sound (audio) ), वा सामान्य गोलन , करिब १,८००  वर्ग किलोमिटर ( ६९० वर्ग माइल ) मा फैलिएको लेभान्टको क्षेत्र हो  गोला हाइट्सको  परिभाषित दुई विषयले बीच फरक छ: भूवैज्ञानिक र  जीवविज्ञान क्षेत्र, गोलान हाइट्स एक बेसाल्टिक उच्चस्थली हो दक्षिणमा यारमोउक नदी द्वारा सीमा, पश्चिमी गलील सागर  र हला घाटी सागर, उत्तर लेबनान मा पूर्व मा लेबनान र पूर्व मा वादि राकाद संग सीमा छ ;र एक भौगोलिक क्षेत्रको रूपमा, गोलन हेट्स छ दिने युद्धको बेलामा सीरियाबाट  इजरायलले कब्जा गरेको क्षेत्र हो। सन्१९८१ मा इजरायललाई प्रभावकारी बनाइयो। यस क्षेत्रमा पश्चिमी भूवैज्ञानिक गोलान हाइट्स दुई-तिहाई, साथै पहाड हेर्मोन को इजरायल-कब्जा भाग पनि समावेश छ।

सन्दर्भहरू[सम्पादन गर्ने]






  1. {{Reflist|30em|refs=Moshe Gat (2003). Britain and the Conflict in the Middle East, 1964-1967: The Coming of the Six-Day War. Greenwood Publishing Group. प॰ 101. . https://books.google.com/books?id=ntLdA8QIgXIC. अन्तिम पहुँच मिति: 7 September 2013. "[on 1965] "Nasser too, assured the American under Secretary of state, Philip Talbot, that the Arabs would not exceed the water quotas prescribed by the Johnston plan"" 
  2. Sosland, Jeffrey (2007) Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin, SUNY Press, आइएसबिएन ०-७९१४-७२०१-९ p 70
  3. ="shapland1997p14">The UNRWA commissioned a plan for the development of the Jordan River; this became widely known as "The Johnston plan". The plan was modelled on the Tennessee Valley Authority development plan for the development of the Jordan River as a single unit. Greg Shapland, (1997) Rivers of Discord: International Water Disputes in the Middle East, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, आइएसबिएन १-८५०६५-२१४-७ p 14
  4. ="Shlaim2000p229">Avi Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. Penguin Books. pp. 229, 230. . https://books.google.com/books?id=CW7GbiUkri0C. "In January 1964 an Arab League summit meeting convened in Cairo. The main item on the agenda was the threat posed by Israel's diversion of water … The preamble to its decision stated: "The establishment of Israel is the basic threat that the Arab nation in its entirety has agreed to forestall. And Since the existence of Israel is a danger that threatens the Arab nation, the diversion of the Jordan waters by it multiplies the dangers to Arab existence. Accordingly, the Arab states have to prepare the plans necessary for dealing with the political, economic and social aspects, so that if necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they are not completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of Israel" 
  5. ="Murakami1995p287">Masahiro Murakami (1995). Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East; Alternative Strategies. United Nations University Press. pp. 287–297. . https://books.google.com/books?id=xVGo3B-82GMC. अन्तिम पहुँच मिति: 15 July 2013. ""The book appears in: http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80858e/80858E0m.htm . The initial diversion capacity of the National Water Carrier without supplementary booster pumps was 320 million m3, well within the limits of the Johnston Plan. ......Shortly before completion of the Israeli Water Carrier in 1964, an Arab summit conference decided to try to thwart it. Discarding direct military attack, the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwater......the Arab states chose to divert the Jordan headwaters.......diversion of both the Hasbani and the Banias to the Yarmouk.....According to neutral assessments, the scheme was only marginally feasible; it was technically difficult and expensive......Political considerations cited by the Arabs in rejecting the 1955 Johnston Plan were revived to justify the diversion scheme. Particular emphasis was placed on the Carrier's capability to enhance Israel's capacity to absorb immigrants to the detriment of Palestinian refugees. In response, Israel stressed that the National Water Carrier was within the limits of the Johnston Plan......the Arabs started work on the Headwater Diversion project in 1965. Israel declared that it would regard such diversion as an infringement of its sovereign rights. According to estimates, completion of the project would have deprived Israel of 35% of its contemplated withdrawal from the upper Jordan, constituting one-ninth of Israel's annual water budget.......In a series of military strikes, Israel hit the diversion works. The attacks culminated in April 1967 in air strikes deep inside Syria. The increase in water-related Arab-Israeli hostility was a major factor leading to the June 1967 war.""